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On General Anaesthesia 
In the third of César Vallejo’s Poemas humanos, a dismayed and badly 
damaged speaker surveys his hospital surroundings.  From the very beginning of the 
poem, though, these surroundings open onto other, much vaster spaces, only to 
close in on themselves repeatedly, in a constant and even vertiginous expansion and 
contraction of spatial scales.  Expansion and contraction, or expansion in 
contraction, for movements outward follow from the speaker’s painstaking 
registration of the sights and sounds of the ward itself. Thus the shuddering of the 
hospital’s windows is seen to “elabora[r] una metafísica del universo,” and the 
buzzings of a fly, humbly “sirviendo a la causa de la religion,” seem to “saludar con 
genio de mudanza, a los que van a morir” (314).  In this echo and reversal of the 
phrase with which, as every student of Latin learns, death-bound Roman gladiators 
were said to have addressed the emperor (morituri te salutant), the dying men in 
Vallejo’s poem receive salutations from non-human creatures, who are now the ones 
“about to die.”  These creatures contain multitudes, then: their buzzings serve a 
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greater “causa,” are enlisted by a collective “genio,” and open onto ancient histories. 
As in many other poems in the often-inhuman Poemas humanos, moreover, Vallejo 
here continually crosses and re-crosses species divides. 
In this unsettled context, Vallejo’s speaker poses a question that at first, in its 
pathos, seems anything but anaesthetized: 
¿Cuánto tiempo ha durado la anestesia, que llaman los hombres?  ¡Ciencia 
de Dios, Teodicea!  ¡si se me echa a vivir en tales condiciones, anestesiado 
totalmente, volteada mi sensibilidad para adentro! ¡Ah doctores de las sales, 
hombres de las esencias, prójimos de las bases! ¡Pido se me deje con mi 
tumor de conciencia, con mi irritada lepra sensitiva, ocurra lo que ocurra, 
aunque me muera! Dejadme dolerme, si lo queréis, mas dejadme despierto 
de sueño, con todo el universo metido, aunque fuese a las malas, en mi 
temperatura polvorosa. (314-315) 
 
The universe whose metaphysics were elaborated earlier in the poem thus reappears, 
and here again it takes a contracted form; if, earlier, universal metaphysics was 
associated with the sound of windows shuddering, here “todo el universo” is 
measured by a unit with which it would appear to be incommensurable: the 
speaker’s own “temperatura polvorosa.”  What happens in states of wakefulness 
apparently involves the “embedd[ing]” of the universe here—wherever “here” may 
be (CP 335).  It’s not easy to imagine a “temperatura polvorosa,” but the phrase, 
delivered as it is from within a clinic, suggests a place inside the speaker’s body. In 
William Rowe’s gloss, “el dolor es inseparable de la entrada del mundo en la 
persona” (147). When one is anaesthetized, or asleep, on the other hand, sensibility 
is “turned inward,” and the poem’s logic suggests that this inward turning entails not 
only a dulling of sensation but also, more devastatingly, an end to contact with “the 
universe,” its disembedding from the body’s inner dust.  
What does it mean to imagine this separation as anaesthesia’s side effect? In 
his essay “Thinking About Agency and Pain,” Talal Asad urges readers to “think of 
pain not merely as a passive state…but as itself agentive” (79). Countering 
contemporary liberal humanist critics, Asad further contends that “pain is not 
merely a private experience but a public relationship” (81).  It follows that 
“addressing another’s pain is not merely a matter of judging referential statements” 
(81-82), as Elaine Scarry and others imply when they emphasize the radical 
incommunicability of pain construed as “private experience.”  On the contrary, such 
address 
is about how a particular kind of relationship can be inhabited and enacted.  
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An agent suffers because of the pain of someone she loves—a mother, say, 
confronted by her wounded child.  That suffering is a condition of her 
relationship, something that includes her ability to respond sympathetically 
to the pain of the original sufferer.  The person who suffers because of 
another’s pain doesn’t first assess the evidence presented to her and then 
decide on whether and how to react.  She lives a relationship. (82) 
 
I will return to the mother’s privileged, perhaps emblematic place in Asad’s account 
of agentive pain and sympathetic response.  For now, I only want to underscore 
Asad’s sense that suffering can be “a condition of…relationship,” meaning, I think, 
both an already relational condition and a condition (a state or stipulation) that 
makes relationship and its persistence possible. 
 This notion may help to account for Vallejo’s speaker’s suggestion that 
becoming numb to suffering leads one to lose “the universe”—or that anaesthesia 
rules out relationship.  Far from seeking “to overcome pain conceived as object and 
as state of passivity” (Asad 84), Vallejo’s speaker solicits pain, even begs for it, as 
one might beg for mercy. This speaker desperately wants to suffer, and he 
characterizes pain, not its absence, as a state of alertness, suggesting that pain is not 
a passive state to be avoided, but rather a condition actively and even creatively 
embodied.  And that the speaker solicits this pain from another indicates that, like 
Asad, he sees suffering as a “condition of…relationship.”   
Yet rather than merely instantiating Asad’s theses—rather than merely 
illustrating that pain can be, as Asad claims, agentive and relational—Vallejo’s text 
asks readers to conceive of pain in this way in a context in which the condition 
called “anaesthesia” has already lasted for some time, though how long remains to 
be determined.  The poet figures pain, that is, in a context in which its agentive and 
relational properties are persistently blocked, forgotten, foreclosed, denied.  The 
clinic in which Vallejo’s speaker is confined thus comes to stand for a much broader 
context of anaesthesia.  And the crisis of sensibility that the speaker diagnoses is not 
his alone.  On the contrary, Vallejo’s “anaesthesia” names a collective as well as an 
individual ailment, a shared historical condition. 
This notion can help us account for the strangeness of the question: 
“¿Cuánto tiempo ha durado la anestesia, que llaman los hombres?” Read as relevant 
to the speaker alone, this question might mean that, having been under anaesthesia 
for some time, he is regaining awareness of his surroundings and asking simply how 
long he’s been under.  But the question’s qualifying final phrase suggests that more 
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is at stake.  Like a set of scare quotes, the phrase “que llaman los hombres” indicates 
that “anaesthesia” is, in fact, a misnomer.  It would follow that the doctors’ science 
does not take away feeling, or leave the patient insensible, but instead relocate 
feeling, shifting sensibility inward, as in the speaker’s next exclamation: “¡anesesiado 
totalmente, volteada mi sensibilidad para adentro!” Here the second phrase 
importantly belies the totalizing claim of the first: if the speaker’s sensibility has 
been turned inward rather than rendered inactive, than he cannot be totally 
anaesthetized—or, being what is called “anaesthetized” for him means a loss of 
sensibility that is less than total. Still, although Vallejo’s speaker retains his ability to 
address the doctors and solicit pain, the desperation of his plea and the distortion of 
his language register the precariousness of this ability.  It is as though the speaker 
were on the verge of losing his very capacity to speak—on the verge of losing 
relation. 
Admittedly, what happens when one is asleep rather than “awake from 
sleep” is anyone’s guess.  Vallejo does not give the reader concrete ways to feel what 
Keats might call “the feel of not to feel it” (François).  If the universe, in Vallejo’s 
vivid but elusive image, comes to be embedded in the speaker’s “dusty temperature” 
when he is allowed to feel his pain, no corresponding images render what happens 
when he does not feel this pain.  There is instead, on the other side of the 
anaesthesia said to be total, only “sensibilidad para adentro.”  There are only 
abstractions, no longer yoked to concrete particulars as were the “metaphysics of 
the universe” elaborated and the “cause of religion” served earlier in the poem.   
It may be the case, though, that the cry addressed to the doctors can only 
come from such a place of blank abstraction, can only be made only by one who has 
arrived in the realm of anaesthesia.  The state of not quite not feeling that is not, and 
perhaps cannot be, concretely communicated in the poem therefore nevertheless 
colors the states of feeling that the poem does concretely communicate, the 
conditions that it treats as the alternatives to anaesthesia.  The not-felt and not-
figured state also informs the words with which the speaker begs to be left with 
feeling. In particular, the construction “Dejadme dolerme” registers the strange fact 
that the speaker needs to be restored to his capacity to sense himself—but can only 
be helped in this way by those whom he addresses. Vallejo’s poem thus locates 
sensation within the speaker’s own body even while it insists that this body is in 
others’ hands.  And precisely this admission that his body is in others’ hands 
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distinguishes the speaker’s suffering from “sensibility turned inward.”_  If the 
infinitive “dolerme” registers the reflexivity of this suffering and thus appears to 
underscore the isolation of the speaker’s body in pain (a body that, we are told, can 
only ever feel its own pain), the imperative “Dejadme” turns outward, so that as a 
whole the phrase “Dejadme dolerme” inscribes the speaker’s pain within a 
collective, relational context.  The speaker’s address to his doctors thus undoes, if 
only barely, the isolation that anaesthetic agents are said to effect.   
Although the language of pain and suffering pervades the Poemas humanos, 
the language of anaesthesia is much more local.  Yet I have considered the 
collection’s third poem at length in order to suggest that its explicit engagement with 
anaesthesia sets the tone for what follows, crucially informing the later poems’ 
figurations of pain and their enactments of the “bodily empathy” that Michelle 
Clayton identifies as increasingly “prominent in [Vallejo’s] late poetry” (Poetry 179).  
Thus even when suffering appears to make its presence felt purely and simply, this 
suffering is necessarily accompanied by the specter of anaesthesia.  Indeed, it is as 
though all of the Poemas humanos were set in, or at least against the backdrop of, what 
the volume’s third poem calls “el mundo de la salud perfecta,” even when the texts 
make no direct references to this world’s sciences (315). 
The speaker in another prose poem, “Voy a hablar de la esperanza,” for 
instance, repeats the phrase, “Hoy sufro solamente” three times. Since the adverb 
“solamente” here connotes not only simplicity or mereness, but also solitude, he 
thus emphasizes that his pain is unadulterated. This pain, he claims “no es padre ni 
es hijo”; it is “sin fuente ni consume”; it has neither beginning nor end and is 
neither means nor end (342-343).  But the very repetition of the phrase that names 
his suffering undoes the speaker’s insistence on its uniqueness.  For this speaker 
protests too much: it’s unclear why anyone whose pain really was so absolute would 
have recourse to a refrain, let alone to assertions, questions, comparisons, and 
counterfactuals like these: 
Me duelo ahora sin explicaciones.  Mi dolor es tan hondo, que no tuvo ya 
causa ni carece de causa. ¿Qué sería su causa?  ¿Dónde está aquello tan 
importante, que dejase de ser su causa? Nada es su causa; nada ha podido 
dejar de ser su causa. ¿A qué ha nacido este dolor, por sí mismo?  Mi dolor 
es del viento del norte y del viento del sur, como esos huevos neutros que 
algunas aves raras ponen del viento.  Si hubiera muerto mi novia, mi dolor 
sería igual.  Si me hubieran cortado el cuello de raíz, mi dolor sería igual. Si 
la vida fuese, en fin, de otro modo, mi dolor sería igual.  Hoy sufro desde 
más arriba.  Hoy sufro solamente. (316) 
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Such questions and answers invite attempts at sense- and image-making even while 
appearing to forestall all “explicaciones.” At first it would seem as impossible to 
imagine the extent of the speaker’s pain, figured as it is under the sign of blatant 
contradiction, as it is to locate a definite cause for it, given that it appears to be by 
everything and nothing.  Without ever having had a cause, the speaker’s suffering 
could only not be caused by something so important that it would appear not to 
exist; it must follow that causes abound.  And yet nothing could cease to be its 
cause, the speaker claims in a proto-Lacanian formulation.  Still, contradictory and 
even self-cancelling claims of this kind are made alongside others that prompt, or 
perhaps dare, the reader to give form to what the speaker’s rhetorical questions 
present as formless, at once unlocatable and everywhere.  And that the suffering in 
question is unlocatable and everywhere—its source by turns far below, or “deep,” 
and high “above”—already renders “solamente” inoperative, or at least ironic.  For, 
whatever and wherever it is, there can be no doubt that the speaker’s pain is not 
“simply” anything or anywhere (CP 343).  No sooner is the speaker’s pain said to be 
self-generated, for instance—“nacido…por sí mismo”—than it is assigned external, 
if still not quite conceivable, origins:  “Mi dolor es del viento del norte y del viento 
del sur, como esos huevos neutros que algunas aves raras ponen del viento.”  At 
once parent and offspring, this neuter egg is the product of a rara avis but also of the 
elements in which this bird takes flight.  Since what follows the image of the egg is 
more of the same—a sameness that persists across various states of difference—it 
would appear that no real change is forthcoming.  But the reader cannot be sure, 
because the signifiers for pain keep shifting, even while their referent is said 
repeatedly to remain stable. 
  “Solamente” notwithstanding, then, what’s presented in “Voy a hablar de la 
esperanza” is not suffering as such, or pain in a “simple” state.  Instead the poem 
records a speaker’s sustained struggle with pain—a struggle to arrive not only at a 
means of communicating but also at a way of feeling in the first place a pain that is not 
the speaker’s alone.  “Yo no sufro este dolor como César Vallejo,” the poem begins, 
and again its speaker insists: “Si no me llamase César Vallejo, también sufriría este 
mismo dolor” (316).  Like the counterfactuals already addressed, this kind of 
counterfactual cannot but belie the claims that it appears meant to advance: boldly 
and repeatedly asserting that he knows whereof he speaks, the poem’s speaker 
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(speaking in the name of someone other than César Vallejo but inevitably also 
speaking as César Vallejo) betrays a non-knowledge—perhaps calling on the inverse 
of poetry’s “power to conjure and linger with what it claims not to mean and not to 
have” (François 462).  “Voy a hablar de la esperanza” claims precisely to mean and 
have, that is, what it does not mean and does not have: namely, simple suffering, 
“sin condiciones ni consecuencias” (316). 
Here one can begin to locate anaesthesia even in its absence—even and 
perhaps especially in the stated presence of unmediated suffering: in the non-
knowledge on which the speaker’s knowledge of his pain ultimately founders.  The 
counterfactual that bears on the speaker’s name—“ Si no me llamase César Vallejo, 
también sufriría este mismo dolor”—is different from the others in “Voy a hablar 
de la esperanza,” though in keeping with the poem’s overall logic or anti-logic.  The 
phrase’s conditional contrary to fact posits no drastic privation or bodily injury, no 
radical change in substance, and no shift in the predicates attaching to the speaker.  
Unlike these metamorphoses, all imagined elsewhere in the text, the change 
imagined by the anomalous counterfactual entails no transformation in the speaker’s 
belief, being, body, or world; it is solely and strictly a change in the self’s name for 
itself, and ultimately no change at all: a poet by any other name would feel as 
acutely. Yet, in its very exceptionality, the phrase, especially when it is read alongside 
the poem’s beginning, names without thereby relieving what ails the speaker: a 
modern if not strictly medical kind of anaesthesia. 
Daniel Heller-Roazen has treated the coming to prevalence of this 
anaesthetic condition, drawing on the histories of both philosophy and psychiatry.  
Heller-Roazen notes that late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century psychiatrists 
arrived at an “understanding of ‘depersonalization’ as a disorder of the common 
feeling,” relating patients’ profound sense of alienation to an attrition in sensibility, 
or to outright “insensibility” (284).  Patients beset by “depersonalization disorders” 
reported that they had witnessed and survived “the demise of their ‘selves’” and yet 
“could reason, with the lucidity of the sane, in the absence of their own ‘persons’” 
(279).  Such reports prompted physicians to reinterpret “the symptoms of what 
had…been dubbed ‘anaesthetic melancholia’ well into the second half of the 
twentieth century,” symptoms that included “‘impressions of emptiness,’ ‘sensations 
of lack, deficit in existence,’ ‘feelings of death,’ and delusional perceptions of the 
disappearance of the ‘feeling of life and the existence of bodily or spiritual 
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personality, either entirely or partially’” (285). 
It would be easy to uncover in “Voy a hablar de la esperanza” signs of 
precisely this kind; the poem’s opening alone, taking leave as it does of the proper 
name that is the poet’s own, appears to announce just such a “perception of 
disappearance.”  The “I” has become separated from itself, and, according to this 
logic, the rest of the poem would chart the painful consequences of this separation.  
But it is not enough to diagnose Vallejo’s speaker with “depersonalization” or to 
link the speaker’s disorder with a collective illness, and thus locate “glimmers of a 
general sensation felt, however dimly, by the aesthetic animal under anaesthesia” 
(289). Another step is required, and taken by Heller-Roazen, who notes that the 
“anaesthetic” illness is not merely pathological, or rather, that its pathology may 
shelter possibility.  Heller-Roazen gestures toward this possibility when he 
concludes his discussion of “The Anaesthetic Animal” bred by modernity:_  
Just as the ethics of Antiquity naturally departed from the forms of human 
sensibility it took to be self-evident, so ours today must begin with an 
investigation into the absence among thinking beings of any ‘general 
perception’: how it came about and where its vanishing may still lead.  Any 
ethics worthy of the name must confront the promise and the threat that 
we may no longer, or may not yet, sense anything at all. (290) 
 
To be sure, Heller-Roazen’s conclusions are sweeping, and I have already argued 
that the Poemas humanos cast doubt on the possibility of any subject’s not sensing 
“anything at all”—on the capacity of anaesthesia to truly anaesthetize rather than, 
say, turn “sensibility…inward.” Still, Heller-Roazen’s hesitations between “promise 
and…threat” and between “no longer” and “not yet” capture the conversion of 
pathology into possibility that I have argued Vallejo’s collection works to effect.  In 
“Voy a hablar de la esperanza,” as in the third of the Poemas humanos, Vallejo 
underscores what Asad calls pain’s relational status, its potential to relate rather than 
isolate subjects.  And again, Vallejo does so not by pointing to a robust relationality 
in the midst of pain, but rather by staging relation’s attenuation. 
Note that the title “Voy a hablar de la esperanza” crucially holds out a 
promise that the text itself does not deliver, for the poem never, in fact, gets around 
to speaking about hope.  That this denial is programmatic is indicated by a change 
that Vallejo made to the poem, crossing out the paragraph that had originally 
concluded it by naming “hope”: “Y en este corazón, que no ha tenido causa ni 
careció de ella; en este corazón, sin espalda ni pecho, sin estado ni nombre, sin 
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fuente ni consumo, no cabe esperanza ni recuerdo y lo que es aún más triste ¡ah 
tremenda caída para arriba! cómo ya duelo a mi dolor” (317).  The redoubling of 
pain in this last phrase undoes the immediacy of the “ya,” turning the present tense 
of the poem into an ongoing rather than punctual state, a time of endurance rather 
than event.  But this endurance is, to return to Asad’s terms, agentive, since the 
speaker strives to make even his pain suffer what he suffers, somehow subsisting 
apart from this pain even while he is constituted by it. Though withheld, this 
conclusion encapsulates this text’s troubling, not to say painful, ambivalence.  
“[T]remenda caída para arriba” indeed: this ambivalence leaves speaker and reader 
alike suspended between relation and isolation, between “sharing suffering” and 
confronting all that stands in the way of such sharing. 
 
The Role of Dead Cold 
Published in 2007, Diamela Eltit’s Jamás el fuego nunca takes its title and 
epigraph from another of the Poemas humanos.  But the novel opens with a scene that 
marks the distance that separates it from the poet to whom it pays homage.  Eltit’s 
narrator cannot for the life of her remember when Francisco Franco died: “No 
consigo recordar cuándo murió Franco. Cuándo fue, en qué año, en qué mes, bajo 
cuáles circunstancias, me dijiste: murió Franco, finalmente se murió echado como 
un perro” (12). The narrator has all but lost contact not only with the Spanish Civil 
War, during the course of which Vallejo wrote the Poemas humanos, but also with that 
conflict’s long and anguished afterlife in the range of Latin American dictatorships 
that Franco’s was seen to have ushered in.  Or rather, she has all but lost contact 
with this period’s coming to an end, with this period as distinct from the post-
dictatorial present. The dictatorship was over, for her, at least, before it was really 
over, and conversely the time of consensus that followed Franco’s demise began 
before it really began.   
This, at least, would be one way to read the narrator’s forgetting, though it’s 
worth noting that this forgetting troubles the narrator deeply from the first.  That it 
does so may mean the narrator’s memory, like pain and relation in Vallejo’s poems, 
is threatened but not yet annihilated.  And the bit of memory that survives, however 
tenuously, may make all the difference—a possibility to which I will return. The 
logic of the reading that I have begun to outline would be, again, as follows: Not 
merely located in the post-dictatorial present, Eltit’s narrator would seem to be limited 
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by that present: although she remembers Franco’s having been alive, she cannot 
recall the moment of his death, the “minor but joyous” event that, for Michel 
Foucault, “symbolizes the clash between two systems of power: that of sovereignty 
over death and that of the regularization of life” (249).  It is as if the narrator of 
Jamás el fuego nunca were, at the Beckettian beginning of the novel, so thoroughly on 
the side of life’s “regularization” that she cannot imagine being anywhere else.   
“Hace más de cien años que murió Franco. El tirano. Profundamente 
histórico,” the narrator will decide (17).  But in the meantime the difference between 
her own life and the dictator’s will have been effectively undone, and the 
“Profundamente histórico” will have become painfully present: the narrator’s 
bedridden companion, less forgetful than she is, can recall “La muerte pública de 
Franco, echado en la cama, muriéndose de todo, práctiamente sin órganos” (13; 
emphasis added).  But his recollection repeats the novel’s first words, which position 
the protagonists on their deathbed, or on a bed that becomes the site of a living 
death: “Estamos echados en la cama” (11; emphasis added). Thus, at the outset, Eltit’s 
protagonists, two former leftist militants who have long since been separated from 
the other members of their defunct vanguardist faction, are shown to occupy the 
same position as the dying head of state: their health is failing, and they have failed.   
As Rubí Carreño Bolívar notes, most critical treatments of Jamás el fuego 
nunca have emphasized its staging of political failure (191).  According to José 
Antonio Rivera Soto, for instance, Eltit’s text records the obsolescing of a range of 
Marxian categories, ultimately bearing witness to the fact that “el tiempo utópico 
que guiaba a un número importante de hombres y mujeres, ha muerto” (129).  The 
horizon toward which past, revolutionary generations saw themselves advancing has 
receded to the point of disappearance, and this recession has left the living—
current, depoliticized younger generations, but also ill-fated and anachronistic 
former militants like Eltit’s two main characters—facing “el caos temporal” instead 
of history (127).  Thus, for Rivera Soto, Eltit’s novel figures not the Habermasian 
“exhaustion”—a metaphor that still allows for the possibility of eventual 
reawakening—but rather, more catastrophically, the outright extinction of utopian 
energies._   
Ángeles Donoso Macaya likewise considers the novel to be a kind of 
negative example.  Whereas Eltit’s other works train readers in ways to produce new 
affects and to forge new collectivities (70), Jamás el fuego nunca instead points up the 
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limits of any political project that seeks to deny the affective dimension (70).  For 
Donoso Macaya, such denial results in the foreclosure of possibility and the 
deadening of collectivity, and Eltit’s novel teaches this lesson by representing “el 
devenir póstumo o en ruinas de una célula política” (70), a process metonymically 
contained in the situation of two militants who, isolating themselves in hiding, 
become “incapaces de desplegar todas las capacidades de sus cuerpos en el 
encuentro con otros cuerpos” (72).  By this account, Eltit’s cellmates are not, as they 
are for Rivera Soto, sometime believers in history who become more or less helpless 
bystanders, watching a tragic history—or a tragic end of history—unfold.  They are 
instead active participants in a still-ongoing history, effecting their own exclusion 
from historical becoming.  It is not, then, that utopian time has died, with Eltit’s 
characters—and her readers, Rivera Soto might add—“bearing witness” (Rivera 
Soto 129).  Instead, in sealing themselves off from other affects, bodies, and lives, 
these characters have effectively killed utopian time and ruled out transformation.   
Tellingly, both Rivera Soto and Donoso Macaya turn to Vallejo in their 
attempts to read Jamás el fuego nunca as registering loss, failure, and disaffection.  For 
Donoso Macaya, for instance, Eltit references Vallejo and thus “retorna a la 
vanguardia…para ilustrar la contradicción de una vida sin afectos. En una ‘época 
carente de marcas,’ en este ‘siglo que no nos pertenece’…([Eltit] 23), lo único que 
permanece y que nos pertenece, parece decirnos Eltit en Jamás el fuego nunca, es la 
intensa marca de los afectos”  (72-73). This reading is undoubtedly compelling, but 
its valorization of affect as such risks perpetuating “the fantasy” described by 
Lauren Berlant in another context: “the fantasy that in the truly lived life emotions 
are always heightened and expressed in modes of effective agency that ought justly 
to be and are ultimately consequential or performatively sovereign” (99).  In fact, 
neither Eltit nor Vallejo encourage this fantasy, and Jamás el fuego nunca looks to “Los 
nueve monstruos” precisely because Vallejo’s poem radically complicates the 
experience of “intensity.” 
In “Los nueve monstruos,” Vallejo seems at once to literalize and to 
radicalize the Pauline declaration: “For we know that the whole creation groaneth 
and travaileth in pain together until now” (Romans 8:22).  The poet literalizes this 
verse by sounding the groans of “the whole creation,” with the scope of this 
“creation” widened to include inanimate as well as animate beings, inorganic as well 
as organic matter.  And Vallejo radicalizes the Pauline verse in two related ways.  
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First, he separates the suffering of creation from any promise of redemption 
understood as a final release from suffering. Second, the poet specifies Paul’s “until 
now”: the groaning and travailing of creation have not simply been continuous 
“until” the time of writing; instead, “Los nueve monstruos” imagines creaturely 
suffering as having increased.  The biblical verse’s “until now” thus becomes a “never 
before” repeated throughout the poem, including in the lines (italicized below) that 
give Eltit’s novel its title and epigraph: 
Jamás, hombres humanos, 
hubo tánto dolor en el pecho, en la solapa, en la cartera, 
en el vaso, en la carnicería, en la aritmética! 
Jamás tánto cariño doloroso, 
jamás tan cerca arremetió lo lejos, 
jamás el fuego nunca, 
jugó mejor su rol de frío muerto! 
Jamás, señor ministro de salud 
más mortal 
y la migraña extrajo tánta frente de la frente! 
Y el mueble tuvo en su cajón, dolor, 
el corazón, en su cajón, dolor, 
la lagartija, en su cajón, dolor. (411; emphasis added)  
 
The extraction of “frente de la frente” returns us the speaker’s abortive (because 
crossed-out) attempt, in “Voy a hablar de la esperanza,” to make his “pain feel pain” 
(CP 642). Except that whereas the earlier, crossed-out phrase intensifies, the 
extraction imagined here attenuates, or lobotomizes, leaving a forehead bereft of 
itself there where “Voy a hablar de la esperanza” leaves pain with a surfeit of pain. 
According to Jean Franco, “‘Los nueve monstruos’ suggests a greater 
degree of desperation within a more concrete world” than what is presented in 
Vallejo’s earlier work (186). “‘Breast,’ ‘coat-lapels,’ ‘wallet,’ ‘glasses,’ ‘butcher-shop,’ 
‘arithmetic,’” Franco continues, glossing the first lines quoted above, “are all parts 
which suppose a system; indeed they imply a social system that produces 
commodities, shops and methods of calculation. Yet they are bonded only by 
suffering; thus, in so far as the health of individualistic society is shown in its 
domination of nature, the symptom of this is suffering” (184; emphasis in original).  
This allegorical reading accounts for some, but not all, of the urgency of “Los nueve 
monstruos.”  Franco underscores the critical force of Vallejo’s poem, and its 
exposure of creaturely suffering as a consequence of a certain system of health—the 
product of what Adorno might call “the health unto death”—rather than a matter 
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of medicine’s unfinished business (58). But Franco leaves the specificity of the 
suffering that “Los nueve monstruos” stages unaddressed.  This is also to say she 
leaves “the anaesthetic animal” untreated.   
Although it would be reductive to read “Los nueve monstruos” as merely a 
document in the history of anaesthesia, or even in the history of literary responses 
to it, I would argue that the poem represents an attempt to redress “the 
secularization of pain” charted by Asad (46-48), a process marked by the epoch-
making use of ether as anaesthesia (Caton).  In the face of pain’s subsumption by 
calculation and its putative separation from relation (both processes enabled by 
anaesthesia), Vallejo conjures another scene: a scene in which, as Franco notes (186-
187), separations of all kinds are refused in order that relations—between human 
and inhuman beings, among organic and inorganic forms of matter—may be re-
imagined and embodied otherwise.  If everything is sensate, then everything is 
susceptible of relation with everything else; no being’s or thing’s suffering is 
withdrawn from ethical consideration. But such consideration would have to do 
away with distance taken to be a guarantee of safety; it would instead have to tarry 
with distances that, like those in “Los nueve monstruos,” “charge so close.”_  For 
the extraction of forehead from the forehead names the process that “Voy a hablar 
de la esperanza” teaches readers to recognize as anything but suffering “simply” or 
alone (CP 343): “solamente.”  The condition of this suffering is instead relational. 
Indeed, “Los nueve monstruos” registers not only the devastation wrought 
by a millennial “separation from nature” (Franco 184), but also, more immediately, 
the disastrous consequences of a denial of pain in and through efforts to contain it.  
Pain chases victims down and seizes them while they are actively denying suffering, 
trying to drown it out by means of distraction or dreaming: “El dolor nos agarra… 
/ por detrás, de perfil, / y nos aloca en los cinemas, / nos clava en los gramófonos, 
/ nos desclava en los lechos, cae perpendicularmente” (514-515).  Pain’s growth 
everywhere, in the poem’s first three stanzas, outpaces not only the increase of “the 
machine” and “livestock”; this growth outgrows our very capacity to gauge it: “el 
dolor crece en el mundo a cada rato, / crece a treinta minutes por segundo” (512-
513).  In these early lines, the ratio latent in “cada rato” is rendered obsolete, 
exposed as insufficient, as minutes explode seconds.  Subsequent stanzas likewise 
confound calculation and cause: 
Pues de resultas  
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del dolor hay algunos  
que nacen, otros crecen, otros mueren, 
y otros que nacen y no mueren, otros 
que sin haber nacido, mueren, y otros 
que no nacen ni mueren (son los más) 
Y también de resultas 
del sufrimiento, estoy triste 
hasta la cabeza, y más triste hasta el tobillo (413)  
 
To nearly parodic effect, these lines hollow out the causal markers “pues” and “de 
resultas,” for it’s inconceivable that, within the framework of ratio, pain could ever 
have as its results such disparate, even incommensurable, effects.  The “I” that 
makes its appearance here, and that Franco calls “strangely subdued” (186), might 
also be called pathetic in the double sense of impotent and charged with pathos.  
Indeed, somewhat paradoxically, it’s the pathos of the “I” that strikes the reader as 
powerless (precisely in failing to strike the reader with force).  What possible 
difference could being “sad”—not miserable, desperate, anguished, horrified, or in 
any other heightened state, but rather, trivially “triste”—make in the face of 
universal suffering, in a world of living dead?  
This is the question that the introduction of the “I” cannot but prompt.  
“El sentimiento no resuelve el dolor,” Rowe concludes, in another forceful 
formulation (57). And the extension of this “sentimiento”—sadness—upward and 
downward, so that it covers the speaker’s whole body has as its effect a further, if 
not final, deflation.  In his very effort to convey the fullness of his feeling, that is, 
the speaker exposes its emptiness—its pathetic falling short of the situation within 
which it arises.  And this moment in the poem is crucial in its very dissonance. It’s 
as though Vallejo’s speaker were departing from the language of Romans to say: 
“the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together now as never before, 
and all I can feel in response is sadness.”   
“[E]stoy triste…y más triste”: already deflated because belated, the “I” thus 
further deflates his capacity to feel by naming himself “triste.” And the late arrival 
and the strangely muted self-characterization of the first person abruptly shift the 
reader’s sense of the poem’s significance. For crucially Vallejo’s “I” enters only after 
he has tried to give voice to the suffering of other beings, to participate in the 
groaning and travailing of “the whole creation.”  The acknowledgment of 
emptiness—if not the “feeling of emptiness” described by the psychiatrists in 
Heller-Roazen’s account, then at least a feeling of insufficiency with respect to the 
McGlazer 210 
endlessly ailing world—in the midst of such giving-voice may be the poem’s central 
gesture. By means of this gesture, Vallejo situates not-feeling or feeling-less in the 
midst of feeling, inverting the feeling in the midst of not-feeling that he figured 
enigmatically in the third of the Poemas humanos, which as a whole programmatically 
refuses the binary opposition between feeling and not, aesthesis and anaesthesia.  
More immediately, the speaker’s is a gesture that casts its shadow over the 
apostrophe with which the poem ends: 
¡Cómo, hermanos humanos, 
no decirnos que ya no puedo y 
ya no puedo con tánto cajón, 
tánto minuto, tánta 
lagartija y tánta 
inversión, tánto lejos y tánta sed de sed! 
Señor Ministro de Salud: ¿qué hacer? 
¡Ah, desgraciadamente, hombres humanos, 
Hay, hermanos, muchísimo que hacer (413) 
 
Although the speaker echoes Lenin’s question—“¿qué hacer?”—it is unlikely that 
anything concrete will follow from his words.  For, as Clayton notes, if the last two 
lines above constitute “a call for action,” it is one that clearly “does away with the 
illusion that anything can be directly accomplished in lyric” (Poetry 224). Yet the 
speaker’s words imply relations all the same; his sadness is emphatically not a 
condition of isolation, although it is not a condition of perfect correspondence or 
robust relation, either.  However much it may pale in comparison to the worldly 
suffering of which it is said to be the result, the speaker’s sadness responds to this 
suffering.  Yet feeling the pain of other beings, Vallejo’s speaker also feels that he 
does not and perhaps cannot feel enough. And the reader is not given to understand 
that any amount of feeling would redeem her or put an end to suffering.  All that 
there is to do must therefore be done from within the “sufrimiento” that the poem 
at once redoubles and renders distant, difficult to sense, impossible to feel fully, as 
“intensidad pura” (Rowe 46). 
“Jamás el fuego nunca, / jugó mejor su rol de frío muerto!”:  again, these 
lines have led Eltit’s critics to read Jamás el fuego nunca as a work that mourns the 
passing of political passion, such fire’s “devenir póstumo,” in Donoso Macaya’s 
evocative phrase (70).  But to play a “rol de frío muerto” (where it’s unclear whether 
“mejor” means “more convincingly” or something else) is not to succumb to a 
death that is once and done.  It is, precisely, to act a part, one that might eventually 
“You, me and the Ether” 211 
be shed so that another role can be taken up, another script begun.  Thus, for all its 
emphasis on abiding and unbearable suffering and notwithstanding its exposure of 
the “I”’s inability to translate or metabolize this suffering into sovereign action, 
“Los nueve monstruos” pointedly refuses to pronounce all passion spent. This is the 
crucial fact or possibility that many of Eltit’s astute readers have missed, even and 
perhaps especially in their discussions of the novelist’s debt to Vallejo: after the 
apparent “exhaustion of utopian energies,” the possibility of their reawakening on 
other terms remains.   
Concluding her discussion of “Los nueve monstruos,” Jean Franco writes, 
“just as the madman projects his obsessions onto the outer world so the ear makes 
apocalyptic noises in response to all kinds of events and emotions. The nine [in the 
poem’s title] is the biological programming that underlies all activity and one single 
cry alone can be subtracted from the cacophony since this is the cry that breaks the 
monotony, the cry of a new life” (186).  Franco’s almost unimaginable image of the 
ear “mak[ing] apocalyptic noises in response” to what it hears honors the 
paradoxical Poemas humanos in its very elusiveness. Are these auditory hallucinations?  
Are we meant to conclude that the speaker is a “madman”?  How could we come to 
know an apocalyptic noise when we heard one, and how could the ear come to be 
an organ for the production as well as the reception of such sounds?  Franco’s 
synesthetic image also tempers the hopefully reproductive note that her next 
sentence, ending as it does with “the cry of a new life,” sounds: there is “new life” 
here, but Vallejo’s is a monstrous birth in more ways than one.  A “parturitional 
figure” will come to the fore in Eltit’s text as well, marking less the Marxian 
maturation of “new, higher relations of production … in the womb of the old 
society” than the difficult birth and subsequent, sometimes abortive sheltering of 
other, and older, forms of life in the times and places that would appear finally to 
have killed them off (Jameson 77).  
Old Obscurities 
Jamás el fuego nunca’s final chapter begins with a return to the novel’s opening 
scene: 
En esta cama, en este mismo colchón, claro, si es que todavía se puede 
nombrar de esta manera, el colchón: tú, yo y el éter.  El éter estaba allí para 
resistir los momentos inhumanos.  Ximena, Ximena lo consiguió, una 
botella, dijo, una pequeña botella de éter, dijo y dijo: sí, lo sé, el éter ya no es 
lo que fue, resulta irrisorio e incluso peligroso, aunque no, no peligroso, no 
me parece, pero qué vamos a hacer, qué vamos a hacer, lo administramos, 
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así lo escribió en exactas y pausadas dosis. (159-160; emphasis added) 
 
At this point in the narrator’s account, her son is horribly sick, but neither she nor 
any of the other members of her clandestine cell can take him to the hospital lest 
they be found out.  Hence the ether, relic of a much earlier anaesthesiology: ether is 
a throwback to a prior phase in medical history,_ and the scenes involving ether in 
Eltit’s novel are also themselves throwbacks to prior moments in the text, and to 
the Poemas humanos.  These scenes explode temporal measurements in a manner that 
recalls “Los nueve monstruos,” with its minutes per second.  And they stay with the 
question of how (not) to say a suffering that’s unbearable in ways that resonate with 
the speaker’s struggles in that poem: 
Años de años o años sobre años que se aglutinan para modelar los 
contornos más comunes de la calavera.  Cómo se podría evocar el dolor, el 
asombro confuso del dolor, con qué imágenes podría rehacer el ascenso de 
una violencia que era concreta pero, a la vez, se desdibujaba entre una 
impresionante abstracción.  Estuvimos allí, los dos, absortos en un parto 
que no, no nos sorprendía. 
 
Fue así: 
 
Se inició un proceso frío, el mismo proceso que había sido presagiado por 
Ximena.  Un proceso cubierto por una distancia en la que se alojaba una 
cuota de simulación.  Se inició sin aspavientos un malestar indeterminado. 
 
Te dije: 
 
Algo pasa o algo me pasa.  Algo orgánico, automático, así me pareció, 
ajeno.  Yo iba recibiendo los efectos programados de un ataque que no 
podía repeler.  Todo lo que sentía o pude sentir estaba relacionado con un cuerpo que 
me resultaba extraño  y desapegado.  Íbamos a morir, el niño y yo.  No 
estábamos preparados, no lo estábamos, falló la célula. (160-161; emphasis 
added) 
 
Here finally Eltit’s narrator pronounces the death of what has been “posthumous” 
throughout the preceding pages.  The failure of the protagonists’ revolutionary 
project—the cause of their separation from Ximena and all their other comrades, 
and the reason for their going underground—coincides, in this retelling, with the 
death of the narrator’s two-year-old son.  Indeed, the project’s failure becomes a 
substitute, another name for, this death, as when the devastating last sentence 
quoted above thus takes the reader from a “we” comprising “el niño y yo” to a 
broader but not more lasting bond that dissolves here, apparently once and for all.   
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Thus Eltit’s critics have not been wrong to read Jamás el fuego nunca as an 
account of failure; on the contrary, in one sense, they have simply followed the 
novel’s lead.  But a failure is not necessarily a definitive end.  To label a project 
failed, in other words, is not yet to address that project’s afterlives, its unspent 
potentials.  As Elizabeth Povinelli has argued, “failure is not an ideal form floating 
outside social space.  Failure is instead a socially mediated term for assessing the 
social world” (23).  It follows that critics who treat Eltit’s text first and foremost as 
the record of a post-historical “time whose fire has gone cold” (Rivera Soto 129) 
may unwittingly advance the very neoliberal logic that they seek to refuse, the logic 
according to which “any social investment that does not have a clear end in market 
value…fails” definitively (Povinelli 23).  Rather than asking “whether this or 
that…was or was not a failure,” Povinelli insists, “we need to start asking [after] the 
measurements of failure, the arts of failure” (23).  Povinelli’s polemic helps to clarify 
the stakes of Eltit’s dwelling in abandonment, but Jamás el fuego nunca itself already 
insists on failure’s social mediation.  The verdict or death sentence “falló la célula,” 
quoted above, is inseparable from the time, space, and relations from within which 
it is delivered: both those of the past and those of the painstaking reconstruction of 
that past in the narrator’s present impasse._  Likewise, at an earlier moment in the 
novel, the remembered death of the narrator’s son ends an imagined scene of bank 
robbery and property destruction: “Están asaltando prácticamente todos los bancos, 
los centros comerciales estallan sin tregua con sus mercaderías diseminadas por los 
pasillos diseñados por un procedimento serial, están vaciando las arcas, mueren 
guardias, muere uno do los asaltantes, muere un niño” (145).  In both instances, 
individual and collective collapses are registered at once.  But crucially in neither 
instance is collapse either final or finally isolating. 
To be sure, the narrator’s son cannot be brought back to life. But the 
narrator outlives him, just as she outlives the cell whose failure her son’s death 
comes to mark. “Íbamos a morir, el niño y yo,” she remembers: “No estábamos 
preparados, no lo estábamos.” Still, she lives to recollect, and her recollection bears 
the traces of the constitutive relationship now lost: “Todo lo que sentía o pude sentir 
estaba relacionado con un cuerpo que me resultaba extraño” (emphasis added).  Here Asad’s 
“mother, say,” whose suffering “is a condition of her relationship” returns, and with 
her the anthropologist’s understanding of pain as relational (82).  To be sure, there is 
nothing inherently redemptive about this relational condition (and nothing idealizing 
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about Eltit’s version of maternity); the “Algo orgánico, automático” that happens 
here is not automatically reparative.  But neither does it attest only to an end. 
 Where has ether gone, then, in this “proceso frío”?  “El siglo pena,” Eltit’s 
narrator claims, echoing Vallejo’s “Los nueve monstruos” at a distance (161).  And 
as the novel draws to a close, it becomes clear that the century in question is still 
that of the Poemas humanos and Francisco Franco. It is still, in other words, a century 
of “living death” (Franco 193), one in which social mediation takes place in the 
medium of ether, of anaesthesia: “Estoy, me dices, cansado. / Estás muerto, te 
contesto. / La cama y el éter, la sangre y el éter, mis piernas y el éter.” (162; emphasis 
added). At no time, though, does ether bring with it either salvation or humanity. 
On the contrary: 
Y aquí vienen todas las células, en grupos que parecen excesivos o 
interminables, llegan acuciosos justo cuando yo estoy demasiado cansada, 
vienen a apoderarse de nuestros cuerpos y a auscultar los dolores que 
tenemos.  Nos duele todo.  Todo.  Nos duelen los huesos y la infección 
purulenta que emana de algunos de los órganos.  …  Las células nos 
remecen de una manera agresiva y alarmante, quieren sacarme al niño y 
buscan mi postrera confesión.  El niño y yo formamos parte de un tejido 
celular, somos idénticos, un perfecto genoma humano.  No humano, no 
nunca. (165)  
 
But if the cells belonging to the narrator’s son were once and perhaps still would be 
a “perfect” match with her own, it is those of her companion and sometime 
comrade with which she is left: 
Miro el montón de células que ya están en un avanzado deterioro, me 
detengo en tus células tiñosas y me dan unas ganas infinitas de decirte: 
levántate, o decirte: resucita de una vez por todas y salgamos a la calle con 
el niño, el mío, el de dos años, mi amado niño y llevémoslo al hospital.  
Debemos llevarlo porque, después de todo, ya no tenemos nada que perder. 
(166) 
 
At first it is difficult to imagine anything farther from Vallejo’s “muchísimo 
que hacer”—the words that end “Los nueve monstruos”—than this “nada que 
perder.” Whereas the former phrase concludes a call to action, the latter, though a 
truncated translation or faint echo of Marx, ends a record of resignation. Likewise, 
whereas Vallejo’s phrase points to an excess, Eltit’s apparently, indicates only a void, 
a nothing where something once was. Indeed, the disparity between these two 
phrases might be read as registering the distance between the historical moment of 
the Poemas humanos and Eltit’s, which is to say our own.  According to this logic (akin 
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to the critical logic that declares “the death of utopian time”), Eltit’s ending would 
echo the last line of “Los nueve monstruos” only to undo it, instead providing a 
tragic indication of the difference seventy years make.  Whereas, Vallejo’s poem 
suggests, even during the Spanish Civil War, much could still be done—projects 
could be initiated and hopes rekindled, if only fleetingly and with great difficulty—in 
our own moment, the enthusiasms that would animate such projects and hopes 
seem extinguished, such passions spent.   
The narrator can thus rescue her child only in a counterfactual formulation, 
in a fantasy whose nature she discloses to the reader but cannot bring herself to 
reveal to her comrade, cellmate, and sometime lover, figured here as a mere 
“montón de células.”  The narrator feels “unas ganas infinitas,” an infinite yearning, 
to give voice to the fantasy that she cannot express—and to do so by delivering 
commands: “levántate” and, more uncannily, “resuscita.” Indeed, it’s as if, in the 
time and space that Eltit’s novel imagines, the imperative mood itself—the mood of 
Vallejo’s “Dejadme dolerme”—had become untenable or fallen silent. Eltit’s 
narrator is thus doubly bereft: she not only fantasizes retrospectively about 
performing a rescue operation that she never, in fact, managed to perform; in the 
almost unbearably claustrophobic world of Jamás el fuego nunca, she cannot even 
convey this desire. Feeling an infinite yearning to speak, she stops short of speech.  
All of this seems to serve as a painful reminder that, whereas Vallejo’s 
poem ended with a gesture toward the future, Eltit’s characters may very well have 
no future.  “[E]l niño, el mío, el de dos años, mi amado niño,” the narrator calls her 
son, prolonging the sentence as if to compensate for the shortening of the child’s 
life. But this son has long since died, and he cannot be revived any more than the 
mound of cells beside the narrator can be restored to health, resuscitated, 
reconstituted as an integral body, let alone the bearer of a recognizable political will. 
Historical difference is rendered vividly corporeal here, so that the “montón de 
células” becomes a collective body as well as an individual one.  In the decades since 
Vallejo declared that there was still much to do, countless bodies—and militant 
groups—have atrophied, decomposed, become so many heaps of cells beyond 
repair and without hope of resuscitation.  This, according to the prevalent critical 
reading I have outlined, would constitute the message of Eltit’s text, the bad news it 
brings about historical difference.  Yet—remembering the “Profundamente 
histórico” offered only after it has been annulled in the novel’s first chapter—I have 
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been trying to suggest that, through her engagement with Vallejo, Eltit in fact 
forcefully refuses such an understanding of historical difference. To be sure, her 
refusal is, “of necessity, uttered from within history” (Anidjar 139). Still, it counters 
the historicism that underwrites our tendency to see the Poemas humanos as belonging 
to a time that is both past and lost. In Jamás el fuego nunca, the Poemas humanos remain 
available, and they continue to sustain Eltit’s work after all—indeed, “después de 
todo” (166). 
Appreciating this refusal of historicism means recognizing what’s old—at 
least a century old—about the “The New Obscurity” that Habermas diagnoses in 
the wake of the collapse of the welfare state.  “When the utopian oases dry up,” 
Habermas writes, “a desert of banality and helplessness spreads” (16).  If Eltit’s 
readers have tended to locate Jamás el fuego nunca in just such a desert, I have argued 
that the novel must be situated elsewhere, that it presents more than a portrait of 
exhaustion defined as utter “helplessness.” Even for Habermas, in fact, “The 
Exhaustion of Utopian Energies” did not mean the disappearance of utopia as such.  
It meant rather a downsizing of dreams: “The utopian content of the 
communication community,” as opposed to that of the laboring society, “shrinks to 
the formal aspect of an undamaged intersubjectivity” (17).  For her part, Eltit 
nowhere holds out the promise of an “undamaged intersubjectivity” to come.  
Instead, like Vallejo, she makes forms of damage—loss, hemorrhaging, seizure, 
cellular deterioration—the conditions of relation. These, she shows, are conditions 
that, in a pained century, no old or new ether can eliminate, and that no one can 
suffer either simply or alone.  
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